Abstract: Deliberative theorists maintain that deliberation can resolve political issues through reason rather than manipulation or force—substituting "communicative" for "strategic" rationality. Skeptics raise concerns that deliberations will become victim to manipulation by participants. Research and theory suggest six types of factors that may affect inclination to strategic behavior: interaction medium, the internalization of political motivation, authority attitudes, Machiavellianism, empathy, and conception of citizenship. Research on the social identity and deindividuation (SIDE) model of media effects indicates that online deliberation in the absence of reminders of collective citizen identity may increase strategic behavior. Self-determination theory research shows that greater internalization of political motivation may reduce strategic behavior. Belief in the desirability of hierarchical authority should undermine the rationale for communicative action. This paper examines data from a study of 386 Pittsburgh residents who participated in a one-day deliberation experiment involving online or face-to-face deliberation. The convergent validity of a measure of strategic behavior is confirmed by the variable's strong relationship with a tested dispositional measure of Machiavellianism. Maximum likelihood analysis of a zero-inflated OLS is used to determine what factors influence the prevalence of strategic behavior. Findings reveal that only small numbers of deliberators report engaging in strategic behaviors, and statistical findings show no evidence of understating strategic behavior. As expected, Machiavellianism, authority attitudes, and online deliberation in the absence of collective identity reminders significantly increase reported strategic behavior. Empathy and deliberative conceptions of citizenship reduces it. Political internalization variables have the greatest overall impact on strategic behavior. Results clarify the type of public that would be needed to hold deliberations without the strategic exercise of power.

Keywords: Deliberation, communicative rationality, media effects, empathy, authoritarianism, political internalization, self-determination theory

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Deliberative theorists and practitioners have hope that citizen deliberation can encourage people to weigh the needs of the community more heavily in their judgments. In particular, Habermas (1984) believes that people have a basic capacity for "communicative rationality," a capacity to come to agreement with others on both normative and factual matters through open and sincere deliberations. A public could make progress on even difficult policy disagreements through such deliberations. In contrast, however, some rational choice theorists such as Mackie (1998) believe that discussion participants will instead be strategically rational and seek to manipulate others to their own desired policy views. Deliberations often do change participants' public policy opinions considerably (Fishkin, Iyengar, and Luskin 2005; Luskin, Fishkin, and Jowell 2002). If these changes are due primarily to communicative rationality, more widespread deliberations could help the public identify and pursue the public good. In contrast, if participant attitudes are shaped appreciably by strategic manipulation, deliberations may well not have the positive public effects hoped for by deliberation theorists and practitioners.

Little, if any, prior research has examined the degree to which deliberation participants seek to manipulate each other and what factors account for such manipulation. Knowledge of the factors that lie behind any manipulation that does take place in deliberations may clarify ways of reducing manipulation as well as what types of participants are best suited for communicative rationality. This paper examines self-reported manipulative behaviors in a representative sample of 568 Pittsburgh residents recruited to a one-day deliberation about local educational issues. The self-report measure shows good convergent validity with a well-tested and widely-used dispositional measure of Machiavellianism as well as other variables. Analysis results indicate that manipulativeness is affected by interaction medium, the internalization of political motivation, authority attitudes, Machiavellianism, empathy, and conception of citizenship.

**THEORY AND RESEARCH**

Habermas (1984) believes that people have a basic capacity for communicative rationality—a capacity, constitutive of the ability for language, to communicate in ways that permit people to come to reasoned agreement on issues of disagreement. Habermas opposes communicative rationality to strategic rationality—a type of rationality in which people act strategically in their self-interest. People who act strategically to advance their self-interest threaten to mire society in a multitude of collective action dilemmas. For example, a typical strategic actor would not vote (Downs 1957), would not join political groups (Olson 1965), and would not contribute to a range of desired policies without a coercive inducement. According to Habermas, reasoned discourse allows people to escape the collective action dilemmas to which strategic actors are subject. This communicative rationality permits people to commit themselves to what is in their collective interests by allowing people to agree upon a normative or ethical framework (Habermas 1990). Ethics emerges out of people's basic social and linguistic competence. Indeed, research on cooperation shows that people who have met and talked with each other are significantly more likely to cooperate in collective action type dilemmas (Dawes, Kragt, and Orbell 1990; Dawes, Orbell, Simmons et al. 1986; Ostrom 2000). Mere speech, then, appears to have some power to undermine strategic behavior and promote prosocial (altruistic) behavior.
In Dawes's (1995) experiment, however, people were more likely to collaborate simply after exchanging social niceties. Consequently, collaboration in this setting did not come from some verbal agreement to collaborate, as a simple interpretation of Habermas's theory might suggest. In addition, the kind of collaboration Dawes observed—in which people collaborated more with those with whom they spoke—would not occur as a result of a sophisticated sense of ethics. A generalized ethics would not permit people to favor others simply because they have socialized with these others. (Of course, this does not rule out a limited, group-oriented form of moral reasoning.) Speech or at least physical co-presence thus appears to exert a power to promote collaboration beyond enabling immediate reasoned agreement or stimulating the exercise of a sophisticated ethics.

The power of speech and co-presence to create collaboration may be in part due to the human capacity for identification with a group. In Mead's (1962) psychology, people develop personal identity by viewing themselves from the perspective of others. Personal identity is not possible without seeing the self from the external point of view offered by various social perspectives. People are therefore (at least partially) socially constituted and identification with groups of others would be natural. Interacting with others whose perspectives a person is inclined to take may stimulate greater concern for their well-being. This offers a possible explanation of the experimental results of Dawes. In Mead's psychology, people seek to understand their own roles and identities by coordinating a multiplicity of perspectives on that role and identity. In its most abstract and sophisticated instantiation, such efforts at coordination will give rise to a more universalistic ethics that would not be compatible with the results of Dawes. Nevertheless, before developing a more universalistic ethics, people will likely internalize the interests of their group in their identities and perhaps develop an ethics in which group interests take precedence. Environmental cues, such as exposure to other group members or reminders of common identity, may prime a group-related identity or group-relevant ethical rules within individuals, thereby making them more altruistic toward other group members.

A more sophisticated interpretation of Habermas's theory may need to make room for such a group-oriented sense of ethics for less cognitively developed adults. Habermas (1990) allows for the possibility that people differ in moral reasoning development, with intermediate levels of such development corresponding to ethical views that give preference to groups with which a person identifies. Such reasoning may well give rise to the kinds of effects observed in Dawes's research. Habermas might be understood as suggesting that through prolonged social discourse people may be able to develop their ethical and other understandings to the point at which preferring an in-group does not occur and people consider what is in the best interests of society.

If such theories of the social nature of people's identities and ethics are even partly correct, the possibility arises for people to collaborate in resolving problems for other than purely strategic reasons—making possible collaboration in collective action dilemma situations. People may possess both strategic and communicative rationality and be called on to decide which form of reasoning to apply depending on context. Ross and Ward (1996) provide experimental evidence that people apply strategic or communicative rationality depending on contextual cues. In this research, participants were divided into two groups that played the same prisoner's dilemma game. The one...
difference was that one group was told they were playing the "community building" game while the other was told it was playing the "Wall Street" game. Unsurprisingly, collaboration was significantly higher among those who played the game under the "community building" label. The label might have highlighted community-oriented identities and ethics, resulting in higher cooperation.

A number of factors may affect people's propensity to invoke communicative rather than strategic rationality in the context of democratic deliberation and thereby their propensity to manipulate others. These include: the medium of discussion, the internalization of political motivation, authority attitudes, Machiavellianism, empathy, and conception of citizenship. Online environments that do not offer reminders of collective identity may increase manipulativeness. The Social Identity and Deindividuation (SIDE) research (Lea and Spears 1991; Postmes, Spears, and Lea 1998; Spears, Lea, and Lee 1990) finds that people in environments that remind them of their individual identities and not their group identities are less likely to modify their views toward the group norm. Indeed, online environments in which participants are not reminded of their group identities often results in "disinhibition" (Kiesler, Siegel, and McGuire 1984; Kiesler and Sproull 1992)—a willingness to make impolite or abusive comments that would never be made face-to-face. These effects of online interaction may be due to the failure of this kind of environment to provide reminders of collective or group identities. Given that people may respond to such reminders by invoking more communicative types of rationality, it may be that online interactions without group identity reminders will also show higher levels of manipulativeness.

The tendency to manipulate others in discussion may also be related to internalization of political motivation. Psychological research indicates that motivations ("regulations") can be internalized to varying degrees with important consequences for people's behavior (Deci and Ryan 1985; Ryan and Connell 1989; Ryan, Connell, and Deci 1985). An integrated motive involves internalizing a previously external regulation into self regulation, often in the form of "important, committed values" (Koestner, Losier, Vallerand et al. 1996). In other words, the motive becomes deeply and coherently integrated with the self or important identities. Pursuit of such motives becomes spontaneous and automatic. An introjected motive has been only partially internalized. People feel an unpleasant pressure to pursue such a motive when reminded of them. Extrinsic motivation is motivation to pursue something due to external, often social, pressure. Integrated political motivation is associated with active political information seeking, less dependence on others for political decisions, less susceptibility to persuasion, more differentiated attitudes, and more voting (Koestner, Losier, Vallerand et al. 1996; Losier and Koestner 1999).

People who participate politically for extrinsic reasons do so begrudgingly and do not see the meaning of the activity. Such people have little reason not to treat a deliberation as a game and therefore to manipulate others. In contrast, integrated political motivation integrates political activity with identity, making participation highly meaningful. For a typical citizen, such integration is likely to be with collective identities such as being a citizen or community member. Such identities will evoke communicative rather than strategic rationality. In contrast, for people who are paid political consultants, political motivation may be integrated with professional roles that would likely stimulate
strategic thinking, but such people will be rare in a broad sample of the public. Thus, integrated motivation should reduce manipulativeness for such broad samples.

People with a strong reverence for authority should also be more manipulative in deliberative settings. Communicative rationality requires respecting others as equals who can engage in meaningful dialog and resolution of disagreements. People who revere authority are inclined to believe that only authorities have the right or capacity to resolve public disagreements. This may mean believing that other people in a deliberation have no right or capacity to resolve a disagreement by communicative rationality. In a deliberative context without clear cut authority such individuals might pose themselves as authorities or seek to get people to recognize or abide by some internal or external authority. In either case, manipulative means may be viewed as a legitimate option.

People also differ in dispositional Machiavellianism (Fehr, Samson, and Paulhus 1992; Paulhus and Williams 2002). Such people view the world as a "dog-eat-dog" situation in which people either manipulate or are manipulated. Because they view people as highly self-interested, manipulation becomes a means of survival. The Mach IV measure used in this paper has relatively subtle questions that tap underlying attitudes that help create Machiavellianism, such as belief in the self-interested nature of others. The measures has been extensively tested and shown to correlate with behavior, including vocational preferences, which tend to be less social or artistic for high Machiavellians.

Empathic individuals should be less inclined toward manipulation in deliberative settings. Empathy involves taking the perspective of others. Such an exercise would underscore that people dislike being manipulated. In Mead's psychology, mirroring the reactions of others is the key step toward building personal identity. Indeed, neuroscience has found evidence that a basic feature of the human brain is "mirror neurons" that help people simulate the experiences of others in ways that create empathy and common social action (Gallese 2005). Mirroring takes place automatically and affects the empathizers, unless they have gone to some lengths to insulate their choices from their own empathy. For most people, then, empathy should reduce manipulation.

Finally, conception of citizenship should matter. Persons with a conception of citizenship as involving reasoned discussion with other citizens about policy matters should be more inclined toward communicative rationality, and therefore be less manipulative. In contrast, people who understand citizenship in authoritarian terms—obeying leaders and disapproving political dissidents—should, like authoritarians generally, be more inclined to manipulation.

**STATISTICAL METHOD**

The decision to manipulate may not involve a simple linear relationship between factors that contribute to manipulation and the degree of manipulative behavior. Empathy and integrated motivation may block the impulse to manipulate in the first place, not simply trade off with other factors in determining the level of manipulation. This may mean that there are two components to decisions to manipulate: whether to manipulate in the first place and, if so, to what extent. Indeed, the data suggest that very large numbers of participants choose not to manipulate in the first place. The distribution of this data is far more consistent with a two-part decision process than a one-part process implying a simple linear relationship between independent variables and manipulativeness.
The two-part decision process will be examined using a "zero-inflated ordinary least squares" (ZI-OLS) model. This model, which was created for this data based on existing zero-inflated Poisson models, depicts a two-part process of determining level of manipulative behavior. First, a participant decides whether or not to manipulate. This component is statistically modeled as a logit analysis that examines which variables affect the probability of deciding whether or not to manipulate. Second, if the person has decided to manipulate, the level of manipulation is determined by a simple linear relationship between manipulation level and factors that affect this level. The main difference from a zero-inflated Poisson model is that an OLS is substituted for the Poisson in the second part of the model. Also, the probability found by the logit is slightly modified to reflect the probability of choosing to manipulate rather than choosing to avoid manipulation. This is simply so that coefficient signs for the logit will have the same meaning as the OLS coefficients—more manipulativeness. The change only affects the signs of the coefficients.

METHOD

PARTICIPANTS

Knowledge Networks (KN), an outside firm noted for its sampling work on academic deliberation projects, conducted the recruitment for this study. Of a sample of 6,935 Pittsburgh city residents (defined by zip code area) who could be reached via random digit dialing (RDD), 22% agreed to participate in this research and took a phone survey. Sampling differed from KN's typical methodology on other deliberation projects in that it did not utilize quota sampling to make demographic statistics more representative of the population as a whole. Thus, the sample accurately reflects who would come to this deliberation without demographic oversampling. The sample better generalizes to what it would be if deliberation were a more widely used process of government, because cost and legal requirements would likely prevent quota sampling. Also, it avoids the concern that those who come to a deliberation after extensive oversampling may be atypical of their demographic.

Of recruits who agreed to participate, 37% or 568 people showed for the Phase 1 on-campus deliberation. A modest response rate was expected because recruits faced scheduling and logistical difficulties. Also, recruits were asked to participate in a series of online deliberations that would take most participants eight-months to complete and which they could join only by coming to the initial on-campus, all-day deliberation. The final participation percentages are not, however, incomparable to that of another substantial long-term deliberation study, Vincent Price's Electronic Dialogue Project at the Annenberg School of Communication [19, 20]. This project started with an effective sample of the population from which its discussants were drawn of about 3,686 [20]. The number of people who ever participated in any discussion over the course of the year is 543, and the average number of people who participated in a given discussion was 305 [19]. Ultimately, the response rates are modest. Comfort can be drawn from several considerations: a fair similarity to population demographics, the fact that the sample represents people who might be expected to participate in longer-term deliberations, and the objective of this research which is partly experimental and focused on psychological processes that should be universal.
Despite a strict RDD sample and modest response rate, the participants in this project reasonably matched the Pittsburgh city population on most demographic criteria. The sample was 77% Caucasian and 18% African-American, compared with CPS population benchmarks for the relevant zip codes of 75% and 20%, respectively. Fifty-six percent of the sample was female, compared with 53% for the population. Twelve percent of the sample was 18-29 years old, 22% 30-44 years old, 26% 45-59, and 27% 60+. This compares with population values of 26%, 20%, 26%, and 27%. The elderly and thirty-somethings are accurately represented, the young are underrepresented, while mid-life adults are overrepresented. Average age, however, is the same as for the population. Perhaps the greatest departure from population values is for education, which, as expected, is greater than for the population. Median education is "Some College" for both the sample and the population. Lower educational categories, however, are underrepresented, with 10% of the sample having less than a high school education and 14% having just a high school education, compared with 16% and 31% for the population. Nevertheless, the sample does contain the full range of educational levels.

Pittsburgh is an ethnically and class diverse community with a city population of 334,583 and over one million including surrounding areas, according to the 2000 Census. Neighborhoods range from suburb-like residential areas to areas of urban poverty. Although Pittsburgh is known to have a moderately high quality of life for a city its size, people intimately involved with public life in the city do not believe this leads to either an especially high level of political involvement or non-contentious public dialogue.

**MATERIALS AND PROCEDURES**

Knowledge Networks obtained phone numbers for households in the City of Pittsburgh from a random digit dial (RDD) sample. Where numbers appeared in a reverse directory, the household was sent an advance letter on Carnegie Mellon University stationery describing the study and indicating that the household would be contacted shortly. A Knowledge Networks phone center called households in the RDD sample and requested the household member with the most recent birth date. Both the letter and the call center indicated that in exchange for participation in the study, participants would have a four out of five chance of receiving a Windows computer and eight months of ISP service. The remainder would receive $100. Those who received a computer would be expected to participate in a longer-term online deliberation from home that would require six hours of discussion over eight months. People who agreed to participate were given a short phone-based survey of their demographics and a few policy attitudes, and they were scheduled for a one-day, eight hour on-campus deliberation. Participants were asked to come to a randomly-chosen day from the deliberation schedule, which spanned three weeks in July, including many weekends and weekdays.

Deliberations were held with up to 60 participants daily. After informed consent and a brief training session, participants took a web-based pre-survey. Next, they were given a 40 minute "library session" to learn more about the four policy topics, a break, 90 minutes for "deliberation" (face-to-face, online, or individual contemplation, depending on condition), and lunch. The library session, break, and deliberation (same condition as before) were repeated in the afternoon, and this was followed by the second survey. In addition to the experiment with type of deliberation, another experimental condition involved either receiving or not receiving reminders of citizenship. In the citizen
reminder condition, participants were reminded to think like citizens by a brief streaming video of the researcher ahead of their deliberations, their rooms had an American flag, and they were given name tags with American flags and the word "Citizen" preceding their names. In the no citizen reminder condition, the streaming video asked people to use discussion or contemplation to inform themselves regarding the best policy option and they were not exposed to an American flag or name tags beginning with "Citizen."

**MEASURES**

*Manipulativeness* (dependent variable) was measured as an average of responses to two questions: "I withheld information during the discussion sessions today to make my position stronger." and "I tried to influence other people's opinions with arguments I knew were not quite correct." These were measured on a seven-point scale (0 to 6) with value labels "Do not agree", "moderately agree", and "strongly agree." The shorthand for the scales is: (Do not agree / moderately agree / strongly agree; 0-6). Manipulativeness was measured for only those participants who were in the online or face-to-face discussion condition, not the control sit-and-think condition, where the questions would not have been relevant. Consequently, data analysis here is restricted to 386 of 568 participants, with complete data available for 373 participants.

*Internalization of political motivation* was measured with three sets of two questions, each set of which respectively measured extrinsic, introjected, and internalized motivation. For example, extrinsic motivation was tapped with two questions, one of which was: "I follow politics because that's what I'm expected to do." (Not True / Moderately True / Very True; 0-8, rescaled to 0-6 for analyses) Internalized motivation was measured with: "I follow politics because it matters."

*Authority attitudes* were measured using short versions (4-6 items) of scales widely used and accepted by political and personality psychologists. This includes social dominance orientation (SDO) (Sidanius and Pratto 1999), right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) (Altemeyer 1981; Altemeyer 1996), vertical collectivism (VC) (Triandis 1996).

*Machiavellianism* was measured with a shortened Mach IV scale (Robinson 1991).

*Perspective-taking empathy* was measured with two scales. One novel measure is naive realism, the idea for which was suggested by Ross and Ward (1996). It involves such questions as: "I can understand why people who disagree with me politically believe what they believe." and "People who disagree with me politically seem to have an agenda." The second measure is the perspective taking component of empathy as measured by a shortened version of the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (Davis 1996).

*Deliberative Citizenship:* Part of a series of True / False questions measuring conceptions of citizenship. This includes such questions as: "A good citizen should discuss politics with those who disagree with them." and "A good citizen should be willing to justify their political views." *Authoritarian Citizenship:* "A good citizen should respect the President." and "A good citizen should condemn people who are un-American."
RESULTS

Considerations Affecting Statistical Modeling

Residuals of a standard OLS regression of manipulativeness on the independent variables prove highly non-normal (p<.0001 Shapiro-Wilk W test). The culprit appears to be the 72% of participants who report zero manipulativeness. In order to predict the many zero values, the regression underestimates large values of manipulativeness and predicts many negative values where there are none. A second OLS regression omitting these participants shows normal residuals (p=.21 Shapiro-Wilk) and a much improved explained variance (R² of .53 as opposed to .30). This suggests that much of the data can be captured with OLS, but that the zero values may represent a separate process. Such a two-part process should be well-captured by the ZI-OLS analysis. Alternative methods for non-normal data do not do well. Box-Cox analysis does not make the residuals appreciably more normal. The desirable type of GLM analysis is not apparent. Only the Poisson distribution seems to do well with the data, probably because it best models near-zero values, but the distribution is typically used for count data rather than continuous variables and results change with linear changes in the dependent variable.

Convergent Validity

An important piece of evidence for the validity of the manipulativeness measure is its relationship with Machiavellianism. The two exhibit a correlation of .25 (p<.001). This correlation is in a typical range for a relationship between a dispositional measure and relevant behavior. In addition to the relationship with Machiavellianism, the range of significant relationships revealed by the ZI-OLS analysis below are broadly consistent with expectations and so further help support the validity of the manipulativeness measure.

Manipulation in Deliberation

The amount of reported manipulation in deliberations appears to be quite low. As already noted, 72% of participants report zero manipulativeness. The average of reported manipulation was .4 on a scale that ranges from 0 to 6. Among the 28% of participants who reported a non-zero level of manipulation, the average rises to 1.5 out of six. Of course, much depends on whether participants are systematically underrepresenting how much they manipulate—a point to be further addressed in the discussion section.
Table 1: ZI-OLS Probability of Choosing to Manipulate (Logit) and Level of Manipulativeness If Manipulation is Chosen (OLS)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INDEPENDENT VARIABLE</th>
<th>PROB. CHOOSING TO MANIP. LOGIT COEF. (STD. ERROR)</th>
<th>LEVEL OF MANIPULATIVENESS OLS COEF. (STD. ERROR)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Online Discussion</td>
<td>.13 (.47)</td>
<td>.62*** (.24)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizen Reminders</td>
<td>.67 (.47)</td>
<td>-.51* (.23)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Online Disc. X Citizen Remind.</td>
<td>-.03 (.69)</td>
<td>-.49† (.31)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machiavellianism</td>
<td>.29† (.21)</td>
<td>.28** (.10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vertical Collectivism</td>
<td>-.14 (.18)</td>
<td>.34*** (.08)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right-Wing Authoritarianism</td>
<td>-.04 (.17)</td>
<td>-.07 (.08)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Dominance Orientation</td>
<td>.36* (.18)</td>
<td>.002 (.09)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Interest</td>
<td>.23 (.17)</td>
<td>-.14 (.09)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extrinsic Motivation</td>
<td>.33** (.12)</td>
<td>.12† (.07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introjected Motivation</td>
<td>.09 (.13)</td>
<td>.01 (.07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internalized Motivation</td>
<td>-.47** (.19)</td>
<td>.22* (.09)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naïve Realism</td>
<td>.13 (.19)</td>
<td>.06 (.09)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Empathy (IRI)</td>
<td>-.52** (.20)</td>
<td>-.02 (.10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deliberative Citizenship</td>
<td>-.35* (.17)</td>
<td>-.01 (.07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authoritarian Citizenship</td>
<td>.08 (.14)</td>
<td>.03 (.07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>.01 (.14)</td>
<td>-.02 (.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African-American</td>
<td>.07 (.07)</td>
<td>.04 (.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>.09† (.06)</td>
<td>.01 (.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>-.23† (.12)</td>
<td>.04 (.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>.37* (.18)</td>
<td>-.39*** (.08)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>1.71 (1.35)</td>
<td>1.71** (.66)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*** is p<.001; ** is p<.01; * is p<.05; † is p<.10, all tests consistent with hypotheses are one-sided.
N=373. All continuous variables are on seven point scales, to allow comparison of coefficient sizes. Binary demographic variables are coded zero and six to also allow comparison of coefficient sizes.
Explaining Manipulativeness

Table 1 shows the results of the ZI-OLS analysis. The second column (first column of coefficients) shows the logit component that captures the decision of whether or not to manipulate. More precisely, this is a logit model that estimates the probability of choosing to manipulate. Once a person decides to manipulate, the OLS component of the model in the third column determines the amount of manipulativeness in which the person engages. Variables that significantly predict choosing to manipulate either do not significantly affect level of manipulativeness or have the opposite sign between these two columns. This strongly confirms that different processes are at work in deciding whether to manipulate versus how much to manipulate. If the true model were is one in which the same process determined both decisions, columns two and three should show far more similar patterns of significant coefficients. The ZI-OLS model appears to be correct.

Columns 2 and 3 of Table 1 (the first column of coefficients) shows that medium of interaction and reminders of group identity (citizenship reminders) have no effect on choosing to manipulate, but have decided effects on level of manipulativeness. In particular, the online discussion coefficient indicates the effect of being in online discussion without group identity reminders. This condition strongly contributes to manipulation, as expected. In contrast, online discussion with group identity reminders appears to have the opposite effect. The effect is the sum of the separate effects of online discussion, citizen reminders, and the online discussion X citizen reminder interaction. This sum is a substantial negative value. Citizen reminders by themselves have a significant negative effect on manipulativeness, as could be expected. Machiavellianism significantly affects level of manipulativeness, but only has a trend relationship (p<.10) with choosing to manipulate in the first place. The effect sizes are about the same, but the standard error for choosing to manipulate is much higher, suggesting that if Machiavellianism affects choosing to manipulate at all it has a more variable relationship with that outcome than with level of manipulation.

Of the three authoritarianism indicators, social dominance orientation (SDO) is the only one that affects choosing to manipulation. This makes sense because people high in SDO believe that some groups of people should rule or dominate, and they typically believe they are members of the ruling group. SDO offers a more clear-cut justification of manipulating others than the other two authoritarianism indicators which have to do with being obedient or punishing deviants. Once a person has decided to manipulate, however, the amount of manipulation is not affected by SDO but is affected by vertical collectivism (VC). VC is a belief in the desirability of acting in favor of the group rather than individual preferences. Perhaps such people perceive a strong need to manipulate others into acting on behalf of group needs.

Political internalization also affects manipulation decisions. The analyses control for a standard measure of political interest to insure that internalization is not simply a proxy for such interest. In fact, political interest has no direct effect on manipulation. The three levels of internalization have the strongest absolute effect on choosing to manipulate of any set of variables. As anticipated, extrinsic motivation promotes choosing to manipulate, while internalized motivation decreases it. Internalization has much less effect on level of manipulation, and the effect is the opposite of expectations: internalized motivation modestly increases level of manipulation. Having decided it is permissible to manipulate, persons with high internalized motivation may consider a
political issue so important that they feel compelled to persuade others, even when doing so means manipulation. The overall effect of internalized motivation is apt to reduce manipulation, a point to which I will return in the next version of this paper.

Interpersonal empathy has the single most powerful significant effect on decision to manipulate, reducing the odds of choosing to manipulate. Also, as expected, a conception of citizenship that involves rational discussion—deliberative citizenship—significantly reduces decision to manipulate. Finally, in a disturbing outcome, more educated people are more likely to decide to manipulate. On the other hand, they will pursue lower levels of manipulation.

**DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION**

Communicative rationality is fundamental to hopes that democratic deliberation will improve the community-mindedness of public opinion. As described by deliberation theorists, such rationality requires people to put aside strategic considerations and address each other sincerely to resolve normative and factual disagreements. Rational choice theorists, however, raise the possibility that people will seek to manipulate each other in the course of deliberation. If deliberation participants become aware that other participants are manipulating them, they would have cause to question the sincerity of others. The ensuing lack of trust could strongly undermine the possibility of communicative rationality and thereby the prospects for developing common ground and a notion of the common good. Deliberation would be undermined.

It comes as some assurance, then, that participants in this Virtual Agora Project deliberation report engaging in minimal amounts of manipulation. Citizen deliberations are the quintessential context in which social norms recommend that people put aside their self-interest and strategic maneuvering and consider what is best for the community. In terms of the Ross and Ward experiment described earlier, deliberation is a "community building" rather than "Wall St." game. Unsurprisingly, then, only 28% of participants reported any manipulative and they indicated minimal levels of manipulation. Nevertheless, an unanswered question with respect to even these minimal levels is whether they may nonetheless be sufficiently high to undermine communicative rationality were participants to become generally aware of this manipulation. Future research may wish to determine where the tipping point is that moves a discussion from deliberative to strategic.

Another pertinent question is whether participants are in fact accurately reporting how manipulative they are. On the one hand, they might be reporting higher levels of manipulation than is realistic because they are disinclined to take extreme scale endpoints such as "zero" manipulation, and they wish to at least entertain the possibility that they might have been a little manipulative.

On the other hand, however, perhaps participants would not reveal the extent of their manipulativeness. Thus, participants may have been far more manipulative than their self-reports indicated. In this interpretation, the analysis above that captures the decision of whether or not to manipulate (the logit component of Table 1) may actually be capturing the decision of whether to report manipulation. A true Machiavellian, however, would have little reason to lie on the manipulation questions. They were guaranteed confidentiality, the survey was web administered and completed in isolation, and it is unlikely that a researcher would care which participants in a group of 568 such
participants manipulated others. Of course, perhaps Machiavellians lie about their tendencies as a matter of habit.

In addition, however, the pattern of results in Table 1 are not especially consistent with the hypothesis that many participants understated their manipulativeness. If individuals with the strongest tendencies toward manipulation would be the most likely to conceal their manipulativeness, coefficients should be significant and in the opposite direction of the significant coefficients observed in Table 1, Column 2. For example, if Machiavellians are more likely to conceal their manipulative behavior, they should be more likely to state that they have not engaged in manipulation at all and therefore have a significant negative coefficient for this column. Instead, the coefficient is substantial, positive, and nearly significant. More generally, every significant coefficient in this column is in a direction expected if the decision being made is the decision of whether to manipulate rather than whether to conceal manipulation. Only vertical collectivism shows a change between the second and third column that might indicate some concealment. While vertical collectivism appreciably affects level of manipulation once a person has decided to manipulate (or to reveal manipulation), it has no significant effect on the decision to manipulate (or reveal manipulation). There is, however, no special reason to think that vertical collectivists, who believe that people should commit themselves to group rather than personal goals, would be especially motivated to lie about their manipulativeness. Rather, such persons should be somewhat inclined to view manipulating others for the benefit of the group in a positive light.

These objections aside, then, this paper finds that six types of factors affect manipulation decisions, as indicated in Table 1. Contextual factors such as online medium of discussion and reminders of collective identity affect level of manipulation but not the probability of choosing to manipulate in the first place. The findings here are consistent with expectations from the SIDE model. Machiavellianism, as expected, affects level of manipulation and almost significantly affects choosing to manipulate. Authority attitudes affect the outcome in expected directions, but only social dominance orientation affects choosing to manipulate and only vertical collectivism affects level. Even after controlling for political interest, the three internalization of political motivation variables affect manipulativeness. In particular, they very strongly affect choosing to manipulate. As for degree of manipulation, only internalized motivation has an effect, and it is the opposite of expectations: it modestly increases the propensity to manipulate. On the other hand, it substantially decreases likelihood of choosing to manipulate in the first place and overall reduces manipulativeness. It may be that once someone has decided it is permissible to manipulate, high internalization increases motivation to achieve desired goals and so results in more manipulation. Interpersonal empathy, measured as perspective taking, has the expected effect of substantially reducing the likelihood of choosing to manipulate. Also, a deliberative notion of citizenship also has this effect.

A noteworthy result is that the factors that determine choosing to manipulate are typically not the factors that set level of deliberation. Why are these decisions so different? Perhaps, as the Ross and Ward experiment suggests, people first determine what kind of context they are in before choosing what rule sets to apply to their actions. If people read the deliberation as a "community building" or communicatively rational context rather than a "Wall St." context, they will choose not to manipulate at all. Green
and Shapiro (1994) also entertain this possibility. If people decide they are in a strategically rational situation, however, they then must determine to what extent their goals are best met through manipulation. Results here indicate that people choose to deliberative based on variables that seem to have a stronger connection to perceiving the deliberation context as strategically rational. As explained earlier, social dominance orientation, which increases the likelihood of choosing to manipulate, presents a stronger rationale for manipulating others than the other authority attitudes, which do not affect choosing to manipulate. Similarly, people motivated to pursue political engagement for extrinsic reasons have reason to view a deliberation as a game, while persons high in integrated motivation have reason to see politics as a meaningful, communicatively rational context. Not surprisingly, these variables affect choosing to manipulate in the expected direction. Finally, a deliberative conception of citizenship and high interpersonal empathy should contribute to seeing the deliberative context as communicatively rather than strategically rational.

Findings in this paper suggest it may be profitable for political scientists to more deeply examine the issue of manipulation in public opinion and other political contexts. Survey respondents appear to provide meaningful answers to questions about how they manipulate information to promote their political views. Deliberation researchers and theorists should further examine the effects of manipulation in democratic deliberations. Much more needs to be known about what level of manipulation is bearable within such contexts for people to continue to collaborate and what effects manipulation may have on attitude change and other outcomes of deliberation, such as opinion leadership.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


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